Introduction
Inequalities in income and wealth have risen in virtually all of the rich democracies over the last 35 years. The average Gini coefficient for the OECD countries in 1985 was 0.29, but had risen to 0.32 by the late 2000s, with inequality growing during this period in 17 out of 22 OECD countries 1 . Top earners, in particular, made spectacular gains in some countries in the 1990s and 2000s, leading to growing interest and concern about the concentration of income and wealth at the very top. Coming on top of these more medium--term and relatively slow--moving trends, the financial crisis of 2007--8 and the subsequent slump has sharpened the debate about how to respond to increasing inequality. Across the rich democracies, governments bailed out insolvent financial institutions run by some of the biggest winners in the income distribution. The resulting public debt problems have led to cuts, sometimes drastic, in programs that favor lower income groups, while capital--holders have escaped the worse consequences of the financial collapse.
Developments before and after the crisis have thus crystallized a broad shift in the political economies of the rich capitalist democracies, toward a more unequal distribution of resources and a rising share of income for the wealthiest.
This shift was for some time relatively neglected by scholars, but has now moved to center stage with landmark studies such as Thomas Piketty' 3 . By paying less attention to standard overall measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient, and focusing instead on the income shares of the top tenth, hundredth, and thousandth highest earners, this research has presented evidence that the wealthiest are increasing their share of income at the expense of the rest, particularly in the United States 4 . The concept of the 'one per cent' --the one hundredth highest earners in society -has been popularized by the Occupy Movement in the US, and American political science has begun to pay great interest in the increasing clout of the wealthy in US politics 5 .
Yet this renewed scholarly interest in inequality and the political consequences of rising top income shares has been slower to take off in Europe.
As a result the experience of the United States has come to define the problem, not only because of its size and importance, and the size and importance of its social science research community, but also because of its status as an outlier at the extreme end of the inequality spectrum. This has tended to skew the debate in the direction of over--emphasizing the peculiar features of the United States, which as well as having the highest inequality of any major democracy, has a quite distinctive political system. Rising top incomes are not a solely US phenomenon and cannot be adequately understood in terms of the peculiarities of American politics. Comparing the US case with other countries where we can observe the effects of a range of explanatory variables on the distribution of income, we can improve our understanding of both the American case and the other advanced democracies. A comparative approach allows us to ask whether the same factors leading to a winner--take--all income distribution in the US cause similar outcomes in other contexts, or indeed whether other variables not considered by the US literature can enhance our understanding of winner--take--all politics and of income inequality more generally. This special issue is therefore premised on the idea that the debate needs to move beyond the US--centric nature of much contemporary analysis of inequality in political science and economics and to adopt a comparative perspective. The obvious place to look for such a perspective is Europe. The following pages outline the reasons for focusing on Europe, and preview the insights that such a comparison can generate into the broader problem of inequality in the advanced democracies. 'winner--take--all' thesis of inequality growth to the US: in most of Europe, the relationship is nowhere near as clear as it is in the US. Yet the US is far from unique in experiencing growing inequality and rising shares for the wealthiest.
Inequality in Europe and
Moreover there is sufficient variation across the European cases to suggest that a simple theory based on capitalism's inherent tendency to favor wealth--holders cannot account for the outcome either. In short, we need to adopt a political economy approach, moving beyond the structuralist logic of Piketty's Capital, and extending the insights of Hacker and Pierson beyond the US case in order to understand the conditions under which 'winner--take--all' dynamics emerge. In the next section we highlight some of the insights presented in this special issue which can help us to understand and explain these developments.
A New Politics of Inequality in Europe? Capital and the Crisis
There is of course a vast literature on the forces determining the distribution of income in the advanced democracies which does a good job of identifying the institutions -such as corporatist labor market institutions 12 , coordinated skills training 13 and welfare provision 14 Financial sector growth in the UK and the US has been convincingly identified as a proximate cause of rising inequality and top income growth in particular 17 . But the changing role of finance in the advanced countries raises broader questions.
Matthias Matthijs' paper in this special issue highlights how European Monetary
Union, a process of incomplete financial integration, had sizeable and differential effects on the income distribution of eurozone member states. In the initial pre--crisis phase of EMU, inequality was declining in the periphery countries, and increasing in the core. The substantial and unregulated shifts of capital around the eurozone in the first years of EMU led to falling unemployment in the periphery, and boom conditions allowed governments to offer generous social policies which boosted middle and lower incomes. At the same time, these capital shifts were driven in part by the stringent wage and fiscal policies followed in the core countries of Northern Europe, which alongside labor market reforms allowed inequality to drift up there. Matthijs also observes that in the aftermath of the crisis the trend towards economic convergence within EMU swiftly reversed, with the data suggesting a rise in inequality in the distressed debtor countries of the eurozone periphery and easier social conditions in the core countries.
Matthijs' paper shows how EMU was specifically designed in such a way as to ensure deflationary adjustments in times of crisis, a strategy certain to lead to high unemployment in the weaker economies and likely higher inequality too. Capital holders enjoy structural advantages which can give them the edge in political battles; by threatening to withhold investment they can enjoy the kind of economic power that relieves them of the need to participate in political battles at all; and they can exercise ideational power in such a way that organized combat is not necessary to win political battles. This latter point is often neglected, but the existence of winner--take--all patterns of income distribution outside the US can be more readily explained by the power of neoliberal ideas promoting finance--friendly reforms than by 'organized combat', for which there is far less evidence in the European cases. The special issue therefore suggests a number of avenues worth further exploration as we seek to come to grips with the emerging trends in the income distribution in Europe. For a long period, research on the political economy of European welfare capitalism was preoccupied with the ways in which organized labor was able to work for greater equality within a context of mass democratic politics. The organization of welfare states and labor markets is still clearly an important part of the explanation for why some nations have moved less starkly in the direction of winner--take--all politics. Nevertheless, the challenge in the current age, in which labor is consigned to a more marginal political role, is to understand how capital is able to wield political and economic power to maintain an increasingly skewed distribution of rewards and close off alternative economic policies. Figure 1 : Share of total income earned by top 1% of earners, 1979--2012 
